invoice_analysis_pay

shallow

io.github.cryptoconspiracy/vurto-swap · Verify this server

Do not use it on an invoice whose split.rule is "brackets" (created since 10/11/2026): its fee is inside the payment and already pays the analysis of both wallets, and the call is refused with analysis_included_in_fee (409). Without checks: the charge of the invoice creator, for an older invoice with payerChecks or paid checks whose analysis.status is awaiting_payment (see invoice_get). Builds ONE USDC transfer of analysis.amount (the price written when that invoice was created: 0.10 Scorechain, 0.40 Merkle Science, 0.50 both) to the Vurto fee wallet (analysis.to), signed by the invoice creator. Sign the charge transaction exactly as returned: it carries the mark that ties the payment to this charge (16 bytes after the transfer arguments on EVM, a memo on Solana). A transfer you build yourself is refused with analysis_payment_rejected, reason charge_not_tied, after the money has left; do not pay again, prove the wallet (destination_challenge with wallet = payer, receiver = details.feeWallet, chargeId = this charge and chargeTxHash = that hash, then destination_authorize) and report the same hash again. Nothing is signed or sent here. The free screening runs first on the receiving wallet and on the creator: a rejected wallet gets screening_blocked (403) and nothing is built; a screening that cannot be read gets screening_unavailable (503). payer must be the creator (the receiving wallet when the invoice was created without a session, which is always the case over MCP); any other wallet gets not_invoice_creator (403) before anything is built. plan has the same shape as invoice_pay (prepare_signing; on Solana POST the signed transaction to /v1/svm/execute), then call invoice_report_analysis_payment with the hash or signature. Paying it from another token is a swap built over the HTTP API (POST /v1/swap on EVM, POST /v1/svm/swap on Solana) from the creator wallet with tokenOut = analysis.token, receiver = analysis.to and invoiceId = this invoice, sized so the guaranteed minimum covers analysis.amountRaw; report its hash or signature to invoice_report_analysis_payment. On EVM only a swap built that way counts (the transaction must match that build); on Solana the Vurto fee wallet must be the only wallet whose USDC rises in it, and it must be the transaction we built, which carries the mark. The minimum must stay between the charge and 10% above it (charge_swap_below_amount, charge_swap_above_amount). A swap that only pays a fee to the same wallet does not count. Errors: no_paid_check, analysis_already_paid, analysis_included_in_fee, invoice_already_paid, not_invoice_creator, screening_blocked, screening_unavailable. Invoices of the new model (Solana, and EVM networks with a split contract): this is how the PAYER buys the paid analysis of the RECEIVING wallet, with their own money, before paying. Pass payer = the paying wallet and checks (["merkle-science"], ["scorechain"] or both). Since 11/11/2026 the charge is the bracket fee of the invoice amount (https://docs.vurto.cc/fees), the same with one tool or two, in the network USDC: invoice_get receiverAnalysisFee gives it before you build ({available: true, amount} in dollars) or says the amount is below the minimum ({available: false, minimum}). Below the minimum the call is refused with amount_below_analysis_minimum (400, details.minimum), and on an invoice in a token that is not a dollar stablecoin with stablecoin_required (400). Adding a tool to an analysis already paid and fresh is a new purchase at the same fee. A tool that already ran on that wallet for this payer up to 30 days ago, with no movement measured on the wallet since (on EVM: the same nonce, native balance and balance of every dollar stablecoin of the network, and no contract code; on Solana: no new confirmed signature and the same SOL and associated dollar stablecoin accounts; a read that fails, or any other token or NFT, is not seen, and then the provider is called), comes from the history instead of the provider; each paid tool of the report carries analyzedAt, the day it ran. A new purchase needs no wallet proof, the payment itself proves it; giving it up and changing the tools of an existing charge do (destination_challenge/destination_authorize for this invoice's receiver; without it payer_signature_required, 401). The free screening of both wallets must pass (screening_blocked 403). It returns receiverAnalysis {status: awaiting_payment, amount, to} and the USDC transfer to sign; report it with invoice_report_analysis_payment (txHash and payer). The fee follows the invoice amount, never the number of tools, and the analysis never goes inside the payment. A charge opened before 11/11/2026 and not paid is rewritten with the fee the next time it is built, and reporting a hash on it pays the recorded value only when the network mined it before this deploy; otherwise the charge is rewritten and the answer is analysis_charge_replaced (409): build and sign again. There is no free reuse: every purchase pays the fee. analysis_tool_unavailable (503) when the tool is not answering: nothing is charged. An open, unpaid analysis does not hold invoice_pay, because anyone can open one naming a wallet: pay and report it BEFORE invoice_pay if you want its verdict to count. A paid one goes stale when the receiving wallet moves, and then invoice_pay refuses with receiver_analysis_unpaid (409) until it is redone. checks: [] gives it up. The result comes back without the receiving wallet. Paying it from another token exists on Solana only: POST /v1/svm/swap from the payer with receiver = the fee wallet (receiverAnalysis.to) and invoiceId = this invoice. On EVM the payer pays with the USDC transfer.

100.0/100

1 trials · measured 10 days ago

invoice_analysis_pay scores 100.0/100 on Vouch's measured behaviour index, from 1 real invocation trials against io.github.cryptoconspiracy/vurto-swap, measured 12 Nov 2026 under methodology v0.2.0. Every measured component scored 100.

Component breakdown

ComponentWeightValue
Reliability35%not applicable
Schema integrity25%100.0
Failure behaviour15%not applicable
Latency15%not applicable
Concurrency10%not applicable

Tool details

Transport
remote
Credential class
self-provisionable
Input schema
not declared
Output schema
not declared
Side-effect classification
unclassified

Score history

DayScoreTierMethodology
2026-11-12100.0shallowv0.2.0

Probe evidence

ProbeOutcomes
schema_integritypass: 1

Raw request/response logs are not archived yet — the outcome counts above are drawn directly from every recorded trial.

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Vouch score: invoice_analysis_pay
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invoice_analysis_pay — Vouch