cve_exposure

io.echelongraph/echelongraph-mcp · Verify this server

Internet-exposure footprint for one CVE from EchelonGraph's KEV-exposure radar: how many internet-facing services (distinct ip:port, returned as exposed_hosts; a machine answering on two ports counts twice) the radar has on record running a version its CVE matcher maps to this CVE, with a country/product breakdown and a ransomware flag. Aggregate and host-redacted; free and keyless. Method: exposure counts are derived from Shodan data. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). Every 12 h, when Shodan query credits allow, the radar runs one Shodan query per tracked product, reads up to 100 ip:port services per query, and keeps a service when its banner version matches a CISA-KEV or high-EPSS CVE; a service whose row has not been written or refreshed for 21 days is dropped. The radar only looks for its tracked set of CVEs: for a CVE outside that set the note says NOT ASSESSED (exposure_state not_assessed), and its 0 is not a measurement. last_seen is when EchelonGraph last wrote or refreshed a service's row, not when the service was observed: a port still listed by Shodan InternetDB refreshes it without re-reading the banner, so a patched service can stay counted while its port stays open. A count is therefore a banner-version inference over a sample, not an exploit test and not an internet-wide census. Its structured result's state is not_assessed with measured_at null, since the answer dates no observation; the count is still relayed, labelled, as what the radar holds on record. exposure_state says what the count is: exposed, measured_zero, not_assessed or tracking_unknown; coverage.in_scope is the API's tracked verdict; freshness is null; data is the API's JSON. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.