jupiter_swap

ing.crank/crank · Verify this server

Execute a token swap via Jupiter (non-custodial). Without signed_transaction: returns an UNSIGNED base64 transaction for your wallet to sign + broadcast. With signed_transaction: broadcasts the caller-signed tx and returns tx_signature. amount is in base units of input_token. Includes the Crank technology service fee when a referral fee account is configured -- collected ON-CHAIN via Jupiter's platformFeeBps, deducted from swap output. Swaps are NOT additionally gated by x402 (that would double-charge the same fee), so payment_header stays a no-op here (jupiter_swap is not in x402 PAID_TOOLS). pay_in_crank is NO LONGER a no-op: the on-chain rate is now derived from this wallet's volume tier and $CRANK staker / pay-in-$CRANK / Crank Score discounts, so a discounted wallet is quoted a lower platformFeeBps -- the same schedule x402 applies to perps/lend/stake. SECURITY: the output_token is run through multi-layer authenticity verification before any tx is built; an unverified/suspicious/fake token is blocked (UNVERIFIED_TOKEN). Set allow_unverified=true to trade an unverified token at your own risk (hard scam signals are never overridable). ``venue_hint`` is ADVISORY, never required -- spot routes via Jupiter aggregation (the only spot venue today); an unknown hint raises, omitting it is unchanged from before. Workflow: EXECUTE step -- deploy the directional/allocation leg after the risk phase capped the size. Non-custodial. Get a price first with get_quotes. See get_trading_workflow. ``idempotency_key`` (optional): a client-generated UUID. Retrying the SAME call (build or broadcast) with the same key + same args replays the original result instead of re-executing -- guards against a timeout-then-retry double-swap. Reuse the SAME key across the build call and its signed_transaction broadcast retry (they dedupe independently); a NEW key means a genuinely new swap. ``verify`` (default True): when broadcasting (signed_transaction supplied), await on-chain confirmation and re-read the output_token balance -- the response gains a ``verification`` block ({confirmed, slot, post_state, expected_vs_actual}). Gate follow-on decisions on ``verification.confirmed``, never on tx_signature alone. Set False to skip for latency-sensitive callers. Verify any prior signature later with the standalone ``verify_transaction`` tool. GEO GATE: when either leg is a tokenized security this call is geo-gated (Reg S = no US persons) and OFAC-screened, same control ``trade_equity`` enforces -- ``jurisdiction`` declares the caller's jurisdiction once (persisted for next time), ``ip`` is the caller's origin IP for the additional Reg-S IP layer. Non-security swaps are unaffected.