validate_private_inputs

co.ainumbers/tools · Verify this server

Verify an artifact's private_inputs[] (ChainGraph Standard §25 ocg-private-input@1) WITHOUT ever seeing the plaintext witness: per RFC 6901 pointer, checks the pointed value inside policy_parameters IS the declared sha256-salted@1 commitment (never the plaintext, §25.2), that the commitment scheme is known, and -- when a §18 compute_proof is present -- that its journal commits the same commitment and binds output_payload. Optionally accepts an out-of-band {pointer, salt, input_value} disclosure package (authorized-verifier path) and recomputes sha256(salt || cgCanon(input_value)) to confirm it equals the commitment. Returns one {pointer, verifiable} record per entry: "proof-only" | "disclosed-verified" | "commitment-only" (no proof yet -- structural + plaintext-exclusion only) | "failed". Pure client-safe compute, zero network, never requires the plaintext.